Mitscher’s Task Force 38 was arranged into four groups. Halsey planned to use Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Force to provide the necessary air support-by this stage of the Pacific war, the blanket of aircraft that a carrier force provided for an amphibious invasion had become a necessary ingredient for a successful landing. Clifton Sprague (no relation) commanded “Taffy 3.”Ĭharged with covering MacArthur’s invasion forces was the second command, Nimitz’s Third Fleet, which for this operation was commanded by Admiral Halsey.
Sprague himself maintained command of “Taffy 1.” Rear Adm. Sprague’s command was an escort carrier group that he separated into three sections. Task Group 77.2 was designated the Fire and Support Bombardment Group for the invasion and was led by Rear Adm. To facilitate landing-beach bombardment and to coordinate tactical air strikes against targets on shore, Kinkaid created Task Force 77. Both commanders were given the objective of landing and supporting the ground forces of Kruger’s Sixth Army. Daniel Barbey, and a Southern Attack Force (Task Force 79), commanded by Vice Adm. The Seventh Fleet comprised a Northern Attack Force (Task Force 78), commanded by Rear Adm. The first was MacArthur’s he was to lead the Leyte invasion force, which was itself divided into two commands: Lt. Because Roosevelt had not committed to a unified command for the invasion of the Philippines, two separate commands were to be used. On the American side, plans were gelling as well. To complete the plan, a diversionary force of four carriers would try to lure the American covering force away from the invasion fleet, freeing the Yamato and Musashi to defeat the invaders. At the same time, the Yamato and Musashi would be supported by land-based planes. Next, the battleships Yamato and Musashi, the largest in the Japanese Navy, were to engage and destroy the American invasion fleet. First, the Fourteenth Area Army, commanded by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, was to construct strong defensive positions well inland and out of the range of American naval guns. The Sho plans were, in essence, Japan’s attempt to fight and win the decisive battle wherever it should occur.įor the defense of the Philippines, Sho-1 was designed as a four-part plan. Japan’s Most Powerful Battleships: The Yamato and MusashiĮach Sho plan comprised an in-depth scheme that implemented offensive as well as defensive tactics. Sho-1 called for the defense of the Philippines, Sho-2 provided for the defense of the Ryukyus Islands, Sho-3 protected the southern and central portions of Japan, and Sho-4 called for the defense of northern Japan as well as the Kuril Islands. Not fully understanding where the Americans would strike next, Japanese strategists developed four Sho (Victory) plans.
BATTLE FLEET COMMANDER 2 CLASSIC NAVAL COMBAT SERIES
In preparation for American offensives, the Japanese had outlined a series of operational plans that came on the heels of the Marianas campaign.
At the same time, Halsey reported that the enemy’s defenses on the Philippines were weak and could be overcome in a timely manner. He proposed that new plans be made to attack the Philippine island of Leyte. This victory prompted Halsey to radio Nimitz to suggest that the plans to invade Mindanao in the south be canceled, because the Japanese were now weakened. Pilots from Mitscher’s Task Force 38 reported they had destroyed 478 planes and had sunk 59 ships. During the raids, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s carriers launched their planes against enemy airfields and naval facilities located from the central Philippines south to Mindanao. “Bull” Halsey’s Third Fleet raided the Philippines as part of a series of attacks in preparation for invading the Palau Islands, 550 miles east of Mindanao, which is one of the Philippine Islands. Later that year, with their gaining momentum, they would enter into the Battle of Leyte Gulf: arguably the largest naval battle in human history.Īt the time, the final decision to either attack the Philippines or bypass them was made in September when Admiral William F. In 1944, following the American victories in the South Pacific of operational commanders General Douglas MacArthur in western New Guinea and Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Marianas, American planners considered the next offensive against Japan’s empire.